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Authority, arbitration councils and
civic society
Hans Christian Korsholm Nielsen
1 When dealing with traditional institutions of arbitration, questions about the relationship
between  concepts  such  as  authority,  power  and  persuasion,  or  the  formation  and
reproduction of these, continue to be the most intriguing and constantly recurring. In
this paper, I argue for a position where the concept of authority should be analysed as a
separate  entity,  radically  different  from  power  and  persuasion,  but,  in  the  actual
operation of the arbitration councils under discussion, interwoven and interacting with,
or in a constant tension with, the other forms of social control. Through this analysis, I
hope to present one explanation for the ability of the popular, non-state reconciliation
councils found in Upper Egypt to adjust to conditions of modern life, and thereby to give
a plausible reason for recognising them as a part of civic society.1
 
Notes on the concept of Authority 
2 The intriguing nature of the concept of authority may be ascribed to the difficulties that
arise when trying to separate it  from other concepts of social  control,  such as force,
power,  legitimate  power,  persuasion,  or  logical  argument,  compared  with  the
commonsense feeling that it obviously differs from these, as one clearly senses through
the insightful description of authority made by Hannah Arendt: 
Its hallmark is unquestioning recognition by those who are asked to obey; neither
coercion nor persuasion is needed. (A father can lose his authority either by beating
his child or by starting to argue with him, that is, either by behaving to him like a
tyrant or by treating him as an equal). (Arendt quoted in Friedman 1990:63/64). 
3 While Arendt’s  description is  disturbingly obvious,  the problems occur when moving
from  such  descriptive  statements  to  defining  an  analytical  concept,  when  specific
delimitations need to be made and the usefulness of  defining the concept  should be
stated. Why is authority not just a sub-category of power, as many would argue? Another
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important point is that one must insist on a definition that ensures that not only those
people or that entity having authority are included, that is, it should take into account
that authority is a relationship between someone or something which has authority and
someone or something which submits or defers to that authority, and that it is not just a
capacity connected with or ascribed to someone. Those who defer are in many situations
well  aware  of  doing so,  and deliberately  submit  either  because  they may gain some
benefit from doing so, or because they recognise that the one submitted to has an insight
that makes the submission worthwhile. At the same time, it is important to bear in mind
that those submitting may also influence the authority in more subtle ways, just as the
son mentioned by Arendt may influence the father. 
4 Another important issue should be to avoid concepts that are inscribed in some kind of
evolutionary schemata, or formulations where different forms of authority are attached
to specific historical eras. Writers about authority often refer to Weber’s threefold ideal
classification of claims to legitimised authority: 
• the Rational grounds: resting on a belief in the legality of the enactedrules and the right of
those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority); 
• the Traditional grounds: resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial
traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them (traditional
authority); 
• the Charismatic grounds: resting on devotion to the exceptional character of the individual
person, and the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic
authority) (Weber, 1978:215). 
5 As is quite clear, however, Weber does not talk about actual authority, but is describing
ways of legitimating power, which is quite different from authority. Another problem with
his definitions is that they are inscribed in a very specific evolutionary story, where legal
authority is  something that  developed in the modern age,  and more specifically is  a
concept derived from experiences with Prussian bureaucracy. 
6 Although the formulations of Arendt succinctly describe the question raised, her stand is
also very much inscribed in evolutionary thinking. As the title of one of her most famous
articles (“What Was Authority”) indicates, Arendt finds that authority is a concept that,
together with religion and tradition, has lost its meaning in a modern secularised world.
She is of the opinion that the concept grew “out of the Roman experience of foundation
and was understood in the light of Greek political philosophy” (Arendt, 1958:110). It was
taken over by the church, which according to Arendt was the carrier of the Roman legacy,
but because of the declining influence of Christianity in the modern world, the concept
likewise lost its position or meaning. 
7 Although such grand histories are not the issue here, it still seems questionable to reject
the possibility of using the concept of authority in modernity, or, for that matter, to leave
out the use of “legal-rational” forms of authority when analysing other places or other
times. What we are looking for, in fact, is a smaller concept, suitable for a more pragmatic
social analysis. One author who has developed such a concept is Richard B. Friedman, in
his essay “On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy” in 1990;2and in order to
define some central elements of the concept of authority I shall rely heavily on this. 
8 A main issue for Friedman is precisely that authority is something that differs from, but is
in the same family as, power, persuasion, force, etc., or, as he writes, it is a part of a
network  of  influence  terms,  but  not  subsumed  under  any  of  the  others  (Friedman,
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1990:60). Authority is notably not a species of the genus “power”, nor is it something
dependent on or secondary to power, but belongs to the more inclusive category of social
control or influence. 
9 It should be noted at the outset that although Friedman clearly defines why authority
stands in opposition to the other terms creating the field of social control, he is not very
clear  about  the  relationship  between  these,  and  the  reader  is  left  with  very  little
knowledge about what happens when moving from the discussion of an ideal concept to a
world  in  which  authority  is  embedded.  Here  Skalník’s  reflections  concerning  the
“tension” between authority and power, coercion, etc. may be useful. He finds that there
is a struggle between these two, which to him are fundamentally opposed concepts and
“which  relate  to  mutually  exclusive  ‘ideal  types’  of  arrangements  of  public  affairs”
(Skalník, 1999:164). In the real world, he observes that the tension or struggle between
the two concepts  is  extremely complex,  but  the overall  quality  of  the arrangements
where authority has the upper hand has proven to be “fundamentally better”, and that
much political  struggle is  actually concerned with reaching the right balance or mix
between the two. While not reducing it to a mere question of a moral discourse, this
means that the arrangements have been “more durable and truly accepted” (Skalník,
1999:164).  This refers to the general observation that naked power, or,  one may add,
decisions based on naked power, rarely survive, and reference is made to the dictum
about the difficulty of sitting on bayonets (ibid.). 
10 I shall present some of the relevant definitions found in Friedman’s essay, first of all to
give a background to the argument that the reconciliation councils found in Upper Egypt
rely on a specific mix of these elements, thus allowing one to say that they qualify as part
of modern civil society. One of the central distinctions in Friedman’s work is between
authority based on being in authority and being an authority.  To some extent this is
similar  to  the  Weberian  distinction  between  legal-rational  forms  of  authority  and
charismatic  authority,3although  with  the  significant  difference  that  the  idea  of  a
historical development from one to the other, and the importance to modernity of the
introduction of a “in-form” of authority, is not a central aspect of Friedman’s writing, and
nor does he recognise legitimate or legitimised use of force as a form of authority. 
11 If we stay with Arendt’s proposition: The father may have a right (even granted by the
state, as was the case with the revelsesret (“right to castigate”) in force until a few years
ago in Denmark) to use force to compel his son to follow a command, but he will certainly
not be in authority if he does so. 
12 Persons may thus be in authority and occupy a position or status that entitles them to
make decisions  that  are  binding on other  people,  or  they may be  an authority,  and
thereby entitled to be believed because of personal qualities; that is, they are experts,
priests or parents, while on the other hand, legislators, judges and generals who are in 
authority have authority over conduct. 
13 The recognition or deference by those submitting to authority is discussed by Friedman
under  the  heading  surrender  of  private  judgement,4something  that  is  essential  to  an
understanding of authority in this sense. This notion should convey the idea that obeying
a command is done “simply because it comes from someone accorded the right to rule,
the subject does not make his obedience conditional on his own personal examination and
evaluation of the thing he is being asked to do.” Or, seen from the perspective of those
issuing the authoritative command, they do not have to “… offer reasons on behalf of
what one has prescribed as a condition of being paid obedience” (Friedman, 1990:64). One
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could say that the source of the claim to authority is of interest, not the content of what is
said. 
14 Another important distinction is thereby alluded to, that of separating a piece of advice
or counsel from an authoritative command and authority: whether you would follow a
piece of advice is conditional on your own judgement of the content of the advice given,
while the command is followed, not because of what is said, but because of who says it.
The concept of surrender of private judgement needs to be qualified, because it raises the
obvious question of whether there are limits to this surrender. Are we talking about blind
obedience,  or are the subjects able to challenge the validity of  the commands of the
authority? Is there any possibility of submitting and at the same time holding personal
opinions or views? 
15 According  to  Friedman,  there  are  a  number  of  possibilities;  (a)  surrendering  to  the
authority  without  evaluating  the  utterances  (commands)  at  all,  because  they  are
automatically understood as being of unchallengeable normative validity; or (b) the case
where a person does judge, but submits anyway, irrespective of his own judgement. “In
the former case what is surrendered is judgement itself... in the latter it is choice which is
suspended: the subject desists from acting on his own judgement even though he may
‘privately’ dissent from the authoritative utterance” (Friedman, 1990:65). These options
are – in a strict sense – valid only for conduct, because authority over beliefs calls for
some kind of “internal assent”, whereas the notion of acting in conformity to commands
of authority allows for dissociation of thought and action, with the consequence that
there  is  “unquestioned  obedience  and  internal  assent”  confronting  an  “external
conformity”. 
16 What  have  been presented  here  are  obviously  cases  where  the  subject refrains  from
questioning the justification, which suggests some kind of conscious act, or at least the
possibility of it. Against this, there are some cases where the subject does not refrain from
questioning the justification of  the authority, but where it  does not even occur as a
possibility to the subject that questions could be asked:  the subject has no option of
standing back and looking at his/her world and questioning the authority. This is what
Friedman calls “traditional authority” or “customary authority (Friedman, 1990:73).5The
rules are self-evident and self-justifying; or it could be said that the subject does not
abstain from private judgement, but that there is an absence of the recognition that one
has the capacity to judge.6
17 The distinction between being in and an authority has more consequences than merely
defining  what  characterises  these  fundamental  forms of  authority,  because  they  are
based on two very different forms of justification or reason for being deferred to. The
justification for having someone in authority is based on the idea that he has to remedy a
problem; that is, the cost of following one’s own judgement may be chaos, for example in
the local community. There is a reason for complying with the commands, and it appears
reasonable to those who submit or surrender to the authority and sacrifice their own
judgement.  At  the  same  time,  the  ways  of  deciding  who  is  in  authority  should  be
accepted: i.e. the oldest in the lineage, someone elected, chosen by lottery or by some
other means. Friedman summarises this as: 
So the point of having someone “in authority” is to be discovered by considering
what  would  happen  if  each  person  insisted  on  making  up  his  own  mind  as  a
condition of coordinating his actions with his fellows. From this perspective, the
authority relationship will then appear as an elaborated contrivance designed to
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achieve  agreement  at  the  procedural  level  in  face  of  disagreement  at the
substantive level … (Friedman, 1990:78)7
18 In other words, the claim to obedience does not depend on any special characteristics
pertaining to the person; his claim to be obeyed is simply based on the fact that he is put
in authority according to established procedures, and what he produces is a decision to be
followed – not a statement to be believed – so that what is at stake is not, therefore, some
kind of internal assent as a prerequisite for submitting to this form of authority. This
differs radically from the justification of an authority, as Friedman writes: 
Here the justification for deferring to some person is that he is thought to have
special  knowledge,  wisdom,  or  insight  or  to  be  the  recipient  of  a  revelation or
unique experience  not  available  to  other  men.  What  is  essential  to  this  sort  of
authority is that something be accessible to one person that is inaccessible or less
accessible  to  others,  whether  this  special  access  involves  expertise,  learning,
singular experience or skill, revelation etc. (Friedman, 1990:80) 
19 We are not talking of a decision to be followed, but of a statement to be believed – the
opposite of what characterises the relationship between those submitting to the person in
authority – and some kind of internal assent is necessary for this response. In comparing
the two, one could say that in the case of an in authority position, the system is logically
prior  to  the  person,  and  in  case  of  an  authority  relation,  the  person  and  his/her
characteristics are the prerequisite for the authority to be exercised successfully. To this,
it should be added that they also differ when one looks at the presuppositions they are
based  on,  where  deferring  to  an  authority  presupposes  a  recognition  of  inequality
between the parties, but deferring to someone in authority does not imply an inequality
antecedent  to  the  authority  relation  itself;  on  the  contrary,  it  implies  some  sort  of
equality that is  recognised by both parties.  That is,  it  implies that both parties have
accepted the presumption that a consensus may not be reached if someone is not put in 
authority. Of course, this does not mean that people do not accept the differences among
themselves or that they are unequal in insight, education, etc. (Friedman, 1990:82). 
20 This is central to the following, because in principle there is nothing that demands of the
in authority relation that there be a prior hierarchical relation between the two parties
(although the authority relation is of course hierarchical in itself).8But again, it should be
noted that on an empirical level – taking more than the actual authority relation into
account – those in authority are often placed in a dominating position prior to the in 
authority relation, through their lineage, etc. This has nothing to do with the authority
relation itself, but is related to power, persuasion, etc. 
21 For Friedman, the question of inequality and the discussion presented here is the first
presupposition for understanding what the concept of an authority contains, but behind
this is what he calls the second or “epistemological presupposition”, by which he means
that: 
… [before] a person should defer to the superior knowledge of insight of another
person [it is presupposed] that such knowledge or insight is in principle available –
at least to some humans. And, in turn, the person who defers must share with his
authority this same “epistemological” framework which defines what sort of things
are  accessible  to  the  human  mind  or  to  human  experience,  even  though  he  is
himself debarred from that knowledge or experience through lack of the requisite
learning, wisdom, grace, revelation, opportunity, etc. (Friedman, 1990:83) 
22 In other words, an authority presupposes a common moral ground or, as mentioned, a
common “epistemological framework”. This has consequences for the understanding of
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the  writings  of,  for  example,  Arendt,  who was  concerned with the  disappearance  of
authority in the modern age. What she is lamenting is the disappearance of a relationship
of authority that is basically an an authority relation, on which Friedman comments: 
...  the  dissolution  of  moral  authority...  applies  strictly to  the  case  of  being  an 
authority because it is here only that authority need be a spokesman or interpreter
of a prior system of beliefs. But someone who is in authority is not necessarily an
authority on anything: his decisions do not have to be presented as authoritative
expressions,  deliverances,  or interpretations of logically prior principles. On the
contrary,  it  is  precisely the key point about the concept of “in authority” to be
dissociated from any background of shared beliefs” (ibid., 1990:84). 
23 The “disappearance of authority” in modern society is, in other words, a movement from
a society based on common moral grounds towards one where other forms of authority
(i.e.  in  authority  relations)  are  more  appropriate.  In  that  sense  authority  does  not
disappear, but the balance between these forms of authority changes, and the an form
may be said to be relegated to more localised forums such as religious congregations,
universities, clubs, etc. 
24 Besides the two central discussions concerning in and an authorities and the concept of
surrender of private judgement, a third concept is treated at some length by Friedman: what
he calls the mark of authority. In order for any authority to be recognised, there must be
some public way of identifying it.  Friedman finds this in the way the communication
takes place between those submitting to authority and the authority itself, and contends
that a command or authoritative communication contains both a substantive proposal
that describes what the one deferring is supposed to do, and also something extra that
identifies  the  one  who  is  speaking  (Friedman,  1990:69-70).  This  is  seen  as  “a  logical 
requirement of deferential obedience” (ibid.:69), because if this extra something is not
contained in the communication, those deferring are left to evaluate the message – the
substantive proposal – and we are then back at the situation where we are not talking
about authority, but about advice or logical argument. 
25 This “extra” in the communication is what is traditionally called the mark of authority, that
by which the authority is identified. This may be anything from figures of speech, or
credentials,  to office, social status, religious claims, miracles, wealth, or tradition and
customs.Because these marks of authority should be recognised, those submitting and
those issuing commands must be inscribed in some kind of common moral, cultural or
linguistic universe. Friedman states: 
Authority thus involves a form of influence that can only be exercised from within
a certain kind of normative arrangement accepted by both parties. Therefore to
explain how one man can exercise authoritative influence over another always calls
for an explanation of the existence (acceptance) of the arrangement within which
the parties conceive themselves to be embraced” (Friedman, 1990:71) 
26 This is central, both because the ability of the authority to make people abide by the
commands  and  the  deference  to  authority  become  something  that  is  dependent  on
context, since authorities are not so everywhere or at all times, and because one could say
that they should be related to some kind of common social or normative field where the
commands issued are accepted as authoritative commands or statements.9
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The Appointed reconciliation councils in Upper Egypt 
27 I have presented these key elements from Friedman’s essay because some generally useful
insights may be gained from them, and because I often find that too little attention is paid
to what the concept of authority may actually contain. It seems too simple just to refer
authority to a secondary place under power or coercion, or a discourse of power, etc., or
at least this would not do justice to the disturbing obviousness of the passage by Hannah
Arendt. However, my main intention is to try to demonstrate some developments in the
ways non-state reconciliation or arbitration councils are arranged in Upper Egypt, which
point towards changes in the authority relations and thereby give an indication of the
ability of the councils to adjust to demands from the parties involved. 
28 At issue is that the disputing parties or those arranging the reconciliation, that is, the
councils, have had an ability to adjust or have been forced to do so, and consequently
have  been  transformed  along  lines  where  the  authority  structures  are  more
“democratic”. This is possibly an adaptation to a general situation where those having
disputes settled by the councils are people who, among other things, through the spread
of mass education have gained another perspective on these traditional ways of settling
disputes, or they may be said to demand more, or at least other, ways of dealing with
disputes than in the past. 
29 This may also exemplify why civic institutions are carving out more space for themselves
in  contemporary  Egyptian  society.  Reconciliation  councils  or  reconciliations  cannot
depend only on powerful individuals enforcing arbitrary solutions; neither can solutions
reached through the sheer use of force be durable in a world where traditional forms of
social control are losing their meaning. Although elders still hold a large share of the
power in Egypt, their position is being challenged by the young and educated and by the
rapid changes in society.  The traditionally localised fields of social  control are losing
importance, because both young and old travel outside the region in pursuit of jobs and
education, and many of those submitting to the councils seem to want to have their own
say, and therefore the procedures by which councils are appointed have to adjust to these
new demands.10
30 Non-state dispute settlement has a long tradition in Egypt, both in rural areas and in the
cities.11Often those in charge of settling disputes have been powerful and charismatic
locals,  who  through  their  position  in  the  local  communities,  or  by  means  of  their
personality, have been given the role of arbitrator in local disputes. The popular image of
the arbitrary decision made by a village headman – ‘umda – springs to mind. The ‘umda 
was a central figure in the legal field, and was expected to enforce state law and secure
order through his corps of guards, along with his other duties such as tax collection and,
in Upper Egypt, ensuring that men were registered for drafting at a suitable age and were
available for the forced common work in the maintenance of the dams, etc. Among the
better-known obligations of the ‘umda was the duty to show hospitality to travellers,
sustaining a “guesthouse”, and settling disputes through personal intervention. Today
this institution has lost much of its importance because of the expansion of the police,
and the position is officially abolished in areas where a police station is found. But in
those areas where it still exists, the ‘umda is most often involved in arbitrating disputes,
and this  may also  be  the case  even in  places  where  the  position has  officially  been
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abolished. Often the families that once held the position still have political or economic
influence, and are sought after as arbitrators. 
31 Although few detailed descriptions of the customary law institutions in earlier periods
are available, Khalifah (Khalifah, 1940), who published on the Ababda tribe of the Eastern
Desert  (which today have mostly  settled in the Nile  valley around Edfu and Daraw),
provides some information about the judges of the Ababda. These were the elders of the
tribe and they administered ‘urf, which Khalifah describes as a substitution for law (qânûn
)  among the inhabitants  of  the Eastern Desert.  He enumerates  several  rules,  dealing
mainly  with  the  size  of  fines  and  compensations  to  be  paid  for  damage  or  injuries
inflicted on animals,  pasture,  wells,  trees and humans:  fines for adultery,  for lack of
submission to orders given by elders/shaykhly members of the tribe, and compensations
for  the  breaking  of  teeth,  legs,  hands  –  and  for  murder.  In  the  latter  case, the
compensation demanded is one hundred camels aged three years or more. One clause
states that “If one man beats another, he who has beaten should pay compensation to the
one beaten as decided by the judges, and if the party hurt is injured the culprit must pay
for the treatment.” Here the term “judges” refers to the elders and the experienced
leaders of the tribe. However, no references are made to their being appointed: their
position is based on their seniority and position within the tribal structure (Khalifah,
1940: 23-24). 
32 Other such personalities have traditionally been – and still  very often are – religious
leaders, such as shaykhs heading the different Sufi orders, or who in other ways have
been able to establish themselves as local leaders through their religious involvement.
Local politicians are also important as arbitrators, either as members of the different
local councils, or as representatives elected to national bodies such as the majils al-sha’ab
or the majlis al-shurah. Election to one of these often implies that the person should act as
an arbitrator when conflicts occur within his constituency. It is most important, however,
to emphasise that there are in Egypt many variations in how arbitrators are found and
selected. It is equally important to emphasise that there are numerous styles of arranging
and carrying out arbitration, as well as differences in the form of meetings dependent on
the arbitrations,  and in the way councils are appointed or how they act towards the
parties they are trying to reconcile – and, for that matter, also in the kinds of power or
authority that are vested in the roles of arbitrators. 
33 This is still the case today in a district like Edfu District in Aswan Governorate. Here there
are numerous variations, and sometimes even those who are active in this field seem to
be developing their own styles, and choosing particular ways for dispute settlements to
be arranged. Some arbitrators accept that the disputants are self-confident and have a
very combative style when approaching a council or arbitrators, while others – especially
older religious leaders – may not be ready to engage in arguments with assertive younger
people, and in cases where these elders are leading or participating in the councils the
whole session may take a different turn. 
34 Differences also depend on the nature of the dispute, on what is disputed, or on the level
of violence involved; there seem to be at least three different categories for classifying
local disputes in the Edfu region. First, there are the very localised disputes, where the
disputants are close kin – that is, it may be a dispute between spouses, or else one that
has limited significance, or has not (yet) reached a level of severity or violence where it is
seen as endangering the general peace of the community. Such conflicts are most often
settled by groups of men or individuals who, on their own initiative, choose to intervene
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in the dispute in order to find a solution, or they may be solved by one of the standing
reconciliation committees found in some villages, as outlined below. A second level may
include disputes  over  property  –  primarily  land –  but  it  also  includes  conflicts  over
inheritance, or outbreaks of violence on a lesser scale, such as fights or disputes that
contain some element of violence between the parties, but where the cause of the dispute
is  otherwise difficult  to pinpoint.  It  is  this  level  of  conflict  that  I  shall  discuss here,
leaving out both the first mentioned and also the third level, which contains the settling
of feuds and the reconciliation of families between whom killings have taken place. 
35 This attempt to develop a classification of the conflicts and of the institutions involved in
settling them is dependent not only on the nature of the cases, but also on the fact that
the men engaged in solving them belong to a large extent to a  different  stratum of
arbitrators, and the institutions – the councils arranged in connection with the settling of
the disputes – differ radically in their form and methods.12
36 The settling of disputes on the first level is without doubt the most common, but at the
same time the one that receives least attention. Taking responsibility for trying to solve
these kinds of  dispute is  such an ordinary and commonplace act  that it  almost goes
unnoticed, and one can be sure that if a brawl occurs in the market or lanes of a village in
Upper Egypt, somebody will very likely try to intervene, and when minor disputes arise
within a neighborhood, or between spouses, a few older men will probably approach the
parties in an attempt to calm them down or find a solution. This is so widespread in
Upper Egypt that, together with the more elaborate forms of dispute settlement where
councils  are  appointed  (described  below),  it  constitutes  one  of  the  fundamentals  of
society. To a considerable extent, the whole idea of reconciling or arbitrating disputes in
reality takes up much more space and time than the outbursts of violence that tend to
receive the attention, especially outside the region. For example, in the much-publicised
case of Bayt ‘Alam, news about the feud and the killings rapidly reached the media, and
was referred as a product of the “infamous clan system” of Upper Egypt. But what rarely
attracts media attention are the much more important and widespread efforts carried out
by numerous people to prevent or contain eruptions of violence and the spreading of
disputes within Upper Egyptian society. 
37 Although  the  more  or  less  anonymous  interventions  made  by  people  in  their
neighbourhood  may  be  the  most  common  form  of  dispute  settling  in  Upper  Egypt,
interventions at the second level are also common. In an area such as Edfu District there
are often one or two arranged every week, while conflicts at the third level of settling
feuds are very rare, and the councils dealing with these are arranged only once or twice a
year. The councils that solve disputes over land, water, inheritance or low-level outbreaks
of violence – the second level – constitute the backbone of the whole scene of dispute
settlement in the northern part of the Aswan and the southern part of Qena Governorate.
They are the councils involving most people as arbitrators and council members, and
they solve the vast majority of disputes at this level.13These councils are known as majlis
al-sulh or majlis-tahkîm – reconciliation or arbitration councils. They are arranged by the
older men of the villages and towns, and are in principle organised independently from
the official legal system. 
38 As  mentioned,  when  disputes  occur  it  is  usual  that  neighbours  try  to  find  ways  of
resolving them, but if they do not succeed they may try to get the parties to agree to have
the dispute investigated and settled by an outsider. Where this is accepted, it is common
that the neighbours involved contact one or more of the elders who are known to arrange
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dispute settlements,  and ask him or them to try to mediate.  If  the elders obtain the
acceptance of the disputants to seeking a solution, then they frequently suggest that a
council is appointed. These councils consist of a varying number of men, the total often
reflecting the seriousness of the dispute: the more the members of the council, the more
severe the dispute.  In theory,  a  number of  rules are followed in the appointment of
council  members.  Among other  things,  these  include  that  council  members  must  be
accepted by both the disputing parties, and ideally the appointment also reflects the logic
of tribal segmentation found in this area, where tribal organization is dominant. In short,
the council members are often chosen from tribal sections other than the one to which
the  disputants  belong,  and  in  the  case  where  the disputants  are  themselves  tribal
sections, or at least referred to as such, those intervening and arranging the councils are
from other tribal sections or other tribes. 
39 In practice, what is paramount is that those appointed are not related to the disputing
parties, so that they cannot be accused of having a direct interest in the case, and this
concept of the council’s impartiality is most important. In addition, a group of men who
have more or less specialised in working as arbitrators are most often involved. It consists
of elders who have a reputation for their ability to settle disputes and arrange councils,
and for their knowledge of the tradition (‘urf), which is seen as the foundation for the
solutions, even though it is not written down and does not contain specified principles. In
reality, the solutions reached are based on the negotiations that take place between the
council  and the disputing parties,  with a reference to precedents,  and a fundamental
belief that the solution should be seen as appropriate according to the cultural or moral
framework, and that it is “fair”. One way of assuring this is that the solution reached by
the council is publicly announced to the crowd of men invited to witness the final stage of
the  arbitration.  The  solution  is  in  principle  arrived  at  through  a  combination  of
negotiations between the council and the disputants, and a secret evaluation of the case
by the council; during the final stage of the deliberation the council will isolate itself in
order to discuss the case and reach a unanimous agreement. 
40 In the earlier part of the dispute-settling process, when the disputing parties have agreed
to the proposed members of the council, it is then often authorised by the parties. This
agreement is central to the argument and is a development that seems to have taken
place in recent decades. An authorisation can be granted by issuing a document called a
mahdar tafwid (statement of authorisation), which is completed before the case it taken up
by the council, and often a specific meeting is held where this document is written and
signed. But this is the ideal situation, and it is frequently the case that the document is
written just before the final meeting starts, or it may even be incorporated in the final
document,  the  mahdar  al-sulh  or  mahdar  al-tahkîm  (statement  of  reconciliation  or
statement  of  arbitration),  which  is  issued  when  the  council  has  completed  its
deliberations.  This  final  document  contains  paragraphs describing the case as  it  was
understood by the council, and is based on an inspection of the site of dispute, documents
pertaining to the case, statements made by the parties and other people involved, and
also the questioning of the parties and of witnesses, which takes place on the day of the
final meeting of the majlis al-sulh. 
41 An example of an authorisation is the following, issued on the 26 December 1991:14
Bism Allah al-Rahmand al-Rahim 
Mahdar tafwid 
It is today Thursday, the date is 26/12/1991 we are in the madayfa of al-‘Amrab in
the hamlet of al-Buhayrah, Edfu District,  Aswan Governorate, to arrange for the
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mahdar al-tafwid between all of the al-Kamilab who are the first party, and the al-
Karajab,  the  second  party.  And  through  this  the  two  parties  have  given
authorisation to the council consisting of the following al-Hajj Muhammad Ahmad
Muhammad ‘Asi and Muhammad Ahmad al-Saman Jad and Ali Ahmad Muhammad
and Shadhly Ahmad Khalil  and Nasir  Ahamd Ali  Hassan and Mursi  Mahmud al-
Tayyib and Sa’id Abd al-Basit ‘Awwad Allah, to do what the council may find proper
and what is in consent with and acceptable to the two parties. 
And Allah is Master of fortune. 
First party                                  Second party 
42 As  can  be  seen,  this  document  is  issued  in  the  guesthouse  (madayfa)  of  the  tribal
subsection of the ‘Amrab, which is a section of the ‘Ashabab branch of the ‘Ababdah tribe,
and  during  a  special  meeting  taking  place  before  the  final  settlement  meeting.  The
dispute  is  between  two  tribal  (sub)sections,  the  Kamilab  and  the  Karajab,  and  the
authorisation is  valid  for  the  whole  of  the  two groups,  that  is,  they are  collectively
responsible  for  the  authorisation  and  for accepting  the  solution  reached.  What  is
noteworthy is that it is not found necessary either to say why the council is authorised,
i.e. that there is a dispute between the two parties, or what the dispute is about. It is also
interesting that no fine is mentioned for not accepting the solution found by the council,
or for not adhering to it or to the authorisation. These points are frequently specified in
the documents. The council authorised to look into this dispute consists of seven men
from the Edfu region. 
43 In the next example, the object of the dispute is specified (but not, of course, its cause –
something the council will settle at the final meeting, taking into account the evaluation
of liability and the solution chosen), together with a fine. 
Bism  Allah  al-Rahman  al-Rahim  Mahdar  tafwid  It  is  today  Friday,  the  date  is
26/2/1988 in the residence and house of al-Hajj Sayyid Na’im ‘Abas, Edfu Qibli, Edfu
District, Governorate of Aswan and present is the first party Yasin Hamid Yasin,
second  party  Mahmud  Husayn  Mahmud  Ahmad  Razaq  who  are  authorising  the
council  consisting of  al-Hajj  Sa’id  Abd al-Basit  ‘Awwad Allah and al-Hajj  Ahmad
Muhammad al-Saman and al-Hajj  Yasin Sa’ad Muhammad and Ahmad Abd Allah
Muhammad al-Sadiq and Muhammad Ali  Amin and Ahmad Mustafa  Hassan and
Muhammad Ahmad Yasin  and al-Hajj  ‘Awwad Allah  Bakri  Uthman and Ibrahim
Yusuf ‘Amr and Ahmad Muhammad Nail to settle the existing dispute between us
concerning a piece of land measuring 8 qirat and 5 sahm, situated in the hud [basin]
al-Nakhl number 9, in section 48. We have authorised the council mentioned above
to find what is proper to solve this dispute. And this is an executive obligation. And
he who breaks the decisions of the council by not following the obligations – Allah
forbid – must pay an economic fine of the amount of 10,000 Egyptian pounds. And
this is hereby the authorisation. And Allah is Master of fortune. First party  Second
party Yasin Hamid Yasin  Mahmud Husayn Mahmud 
44 Note that this time the disputing parties are individuals. To some extent, individuals are
accountable for actions by the members of their households as well, or for others who
may support them, and also for the dispute not being taken up again after it has been
settled. However, the council will have a weak case if it tries to make the signatory parties
pay the fine, if they are not clearly responsible for a reinstigation of the dispute. 
45 This time the meeting arranged for the signing of the authorisation is held at a private
home (in Edfu Qibli). This does not mean that the final meeting (the majlis al-sulh) is going
to be held here, and it will most likely take place at a guesthouse. That the signing of the
authorisation is happening in a private home is possible because this case has only two
disputants. As can be seen, the conflict is over a specific piece of agricultural land of 8
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qirat and 5 sahm. The fine that a party may be forced to pay if it does not accept and
follow the council’s solution is quite substantial: 10,000 Egyptian pounds in 1988. 
46 There are other possible fines: in some cases the disputing parties have to hand in blank
cheques to the council, and it is then up to the council to decide the amount of the fine
and what the money will be used for. A third variation is that the council specifies that if
one party breaks with the decision taken by the council, the other party has the right to
take the case to the local official court, which for these cases is the district court of Edfu.
This variation shows that although these councils are arranged by locals, and in principle
are not connected to the official legal system, there is a certain interaction between the
two systems, and even if the councils are seen locally as belonging to an arena that is
distinctively different from that of state courts, bureaucrats, lawyers and judges, and one
where Arabic, Islamic and tribal values are central, there is still a an overlap between one
and the other. 
47 In this connection it  is  important to mention that sometimes the documents contain
clauses that specify that if any of the parties have taken the same case to the local court,
or submitted a complaint to the police, then these should be withdrawn, or there may be
a clause underlining that the solution reached by the council should be valid both in
regard to the authorities and the tradition (‘urf). In these cases, the authorisation may be
said  to  have  the  function  of  delimiting  a  particular  legal  field,  of  specifying  the
jurisdiction of the councils, thereby ensuring that what might otherwise constitute an
uncertain situation of competing fields of legality is dealt with, at least for a while. 
48 As can be seen, there is a wide range of implications in having the disputing parties sign
the  mahdar  tafwid,  whether  pertaining  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  councils,  to  the
interaction  between  state  institutions  and  these  popular  councils,  or  to  the  dispute
process (because the signing of the document limits the possibility of further negotiation
by  the  disputants),  etc.  But  the  central  aspect  is  the  way  in  which  the  council  is
appointed, and how those appointed are vested with authority. 
 
Dispute Settling and NGOs 
49 As an example of other new developments in dispute settlement in Upper Egypt, there
has been a growing interaction between the long-established reconciliation processes and
new  forms  of  social  organization.  Some  have  aligned  themselves  with  organisations
belonging to the area of modern civil society, those favoured by donor organisations and
referred to when discussing the state of civil society in Egypt. In many areas of Upper
Egypt, different NGOs are taking care of specific issues, or focusing on specific problems
occurring in the villages and towns. Also widespread are the Community Development
Organisations (CDAs). These not only target a specific topic, but through a number of
subcommittees may be involved in a wide range of projects and issues in the villages.
They may have committees that focus on women’s issues, arranging sewing or literacy
classes, or a particular committee running a kindergarten in the village, or a committee
working with water and sewage, or they may run small loan funds, such as revolving
funds intended to help villagers upgrade their water and sanitary installations, and they
may  also  have  a  standing  reconciliation  committee  –  a  lajnah  musalaha.  These  last
committees  constitute  an  ordinary  subcommittee  under  the  CDA  board,  and  are  in
principle organised along the same lines as the other types of committee. 
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50 For example, the village of al-Daqadiq in Edfu district has a reconciliation committee
consisting of five members. In principle, the members are selected so as to represent the
different tribes and tribal sections found in the village. Of these five members, some are
elderly gentlemen who are pensioners, others are full- or part-time teachers at the local
al-Azhar primary school, one of whom is the nephew of the ‘umda of the whole of the
village area. The way they are appointed is through being active in the CDA, and one of
the five also holds the position of chairman of the CDA’s board. The connection to the
CDA not only has an influence on who the members on the committee are, but on its
judicial status, because it can only intervene in disputes occurring in the village, or in the
area covered by the local CDA. Disputes that involve persons from different villages may
not  be  solved  by  these  councils,  and  are  referred  to  another  council,  such  as  the
traditional ones mentioned above. That is why the nephew of the ‘umda,  and not the
village headman himself, is part of the committee: the headman is involved in the circuit
of councils spanning a larger area. This does not mean that the councils exist in isolation:
meetings are sometimes held with similar councils in neighbouring villages, in order to
find ways to settle disputes that involve participants from both villages. But in principle,
the jurisdiction of the councils is limited to the area covered by the CDA. There are also
other limits: if a dispute reaches a certain severity, the committee is regarded as not
strong enough to solve the problem, and will have to rely on the other, types of council
described above. 
51 In general, it can be said that as a result of being appointed by the elected boards of the
CDAs, the reconciliation committees acquire a status different from that of traditional
arbitrators: they are the appointees of an elected board, seen as representing a specific
area. This does not, of course, say anything about whether the CDA in a specific case is
representative of a village. In certain cases the CDA represents only some of the tribes
living  in  an  area,  and it  is  notorious  that  the  tribes  known to  be  marginalised  and
traditionally limited in their choice of occupation are most often those not represented
on  CDA  boards,  nor  even  members  of  their  community  organisations.  In  principle,
however, this does not change the status of the reconciliation committees, which are as
much a part of civil society as the boards and CDAs appointing them. 
52 COUNCILS, CUSTOMARY LAW AND CIVIC SOCIETY 
53 It is important to note that the continuing significance of the reconciliation councils in
Upper Egypt is not simply a product of a growing civic plurality in Egypt (although this is
certainly part of it – Norton, 1999); nor should they be seen as a simple reaction to the
incapability of the official legal system, or a reaction caused by the widespread popular
mistrust of that system. These councils are an integral part of local communities and are
invested with numerous layers of political and symbolic meaning. They should therefore
primarily be analysed not as a reaction to something, but as an important, integrated
component of Upper Egyptian society (see Nielsen, forthcoming). But if one looks at the
specific forms of authority created through the ways a particular group of councils are
organised, the introduction of the authorisation has changed not only the manner in
which people are appointed, but also how their authority is established. 
54 Earlier  in  this  paper  reference  was  made  to  Peter  Skalník.  According  to  him,  much
political struggle is concerned with finding a balance between authority and power. From
the discussion of  the essay by Friedman,  it  was  seen that  the field of  social  control
consists  of  a  wider  range  of  concepts:  those  mentioned  here  have  been  authority,
legitimised power, power, persuasion. In addition, it can be strongly argued that much
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change and political development seems to be a question of reaching an agreement on
how these concepts are to be balanced in social life. 
55 In the case of the reconciliation councils of Upper Egypt, the introduction of the mahdar
tafwid  into  the  process  is  in  line  with  a range  of developments  in  Egyptian  society,
because  the  change  in  the  way  the  councils  are  set  up  also  reveals  changes  in  the
authority structures.  Today,  there seems to be a trend towards using the practice of
authorisation, thereby putting some people into positions of authority in ways that were
not common in earlier times. Although the above discussion indicates that there is a wide
range of methods to ensure that the solutions found by the arbitrators of the councils of
Upper Egypt are followed, a primary one being the possibility of levying a fine on a party
who may not follow the solution reached by the council, and persuading the parties to
accept a solution – something that points towards legitimate power, and not to authority
in the strict sense – this may be seen as just one more layer of means added from the field
of social control. 
56 What is  important  is  that  the members  of  the councils  are  appointed,  and given an
authority that contains specific preconditions to ensure a greater degree of equality, and
also the possibility of replacing those sitting on the councils. They therefore represent a
form of authority where the central point is that they issue a command to be followed,
and  not  one  to  be  believed  –  a  difference  that  clearly  indicates  that  the  changing
conditions in Egypt have influenced the working of the councils. 
57 For  those  sitting  on  the  councils  the  situation  has  also  changed,  because  they  are
appointed to them through the authorisation, and in order to establish their position
they no longer have to refer to their seniority, or their position within the tribal system,
or  that  they  hold  specific  political  positions.  They  are  members  and have  authority
because they are appointed, and not because some other structure of power or authority
is invoked. 
58 It  has  been suggested (Alrabaa,  1986)  that  traditional  forms of  arbitration are losing
influence among the younger generation because of their autocratic and old-fashioned
forms of argument, as well as the ways in which their authority is created. As a result of
education and exposure to new forms of social affiliation, younger people have become
accustomed to and are in favour of a more combative form of communication. In the
councils described here, there is no tendency for those having cases settled by the council
to be from an older generation. The council members themselves are usually older men,
but this is  because their experience and knowledge is  demanded by those in charge.
Furthermore, acting as an arbitrator is very time-consuming, carrying the responsibility
of attending numerous meetings, and often requiring much time to be spent arranging
for the proper documentation to be in place, which may involve meetings with officials,
etc. To many arbitrators, and especially those who are normally chosen to be council
leaders, the role of arbiter can become a full-time profession. 
59 However,  those having cases settled are both young and old,  and either may use an
argumentative form, something clearly observable in that segment of the dispute-settling
process where the parties and witnesses are questioned. This may be difficult to accept
for older shaykhs or religious figures, who find that their authority may be challenged by
self-confident youngsters or by people whose position in the social hierarchy does not
usually allow them to be outspoken in the presence of older shaykhs. With the use of the
authorisations, this is in principle not a problem, since the members of the councils are
there because they are appointed and authorised, and the validity of their authority,
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power or argument is therefore limited, as it is clearly indicated where and in which
situations their statements can be authoritative. 
60 Another important point is that those arbitrating do not have to ensure that the parties
involved believe that they are in touch with any higher power when finding a solution to
the dispute. Their solution is one that should followed up by action, and not one that
should necessarily be believed. As the threat of chaos in the local community was given as
a  reason  for  people  to  accept  someone  being  in  authority  and  the  procedures  for
appointing a council  may be seen as “an elaborated contrivance designed to achieve
agreement at the procedural level in face of disagreement at the substantive level...”
(Friedman, 1990:78). That is, the parties agree to the procedures, to the appointment of
the council and deference to its rulings, in order to solve problems occurring on the
substantive level; after the mahdar tafwid has been signed it is time for action! 
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NOTES
1. For  other  variations  on  the  theme,  see  Hans  Chr.  Korsholm  Nielsen  (1998a,  1998b,  and
forthcoming) 
2. First published in 1973. 
3. With the limitations mentioned above. 
4. The  concept  of  “surrender  of  private  judgement”  has  caused  dispute  since  it  was  “re-
introduced” by Friedman in his article from 1973;  see for example Joseph Raz (1990:115-141)
Steven Lukes (1990:203-217) and Richard Flathman (1980) – the latter being the most thorough. 
5. In this, there are of course similarities to the (too) often used concept of doxa presented by
Bourdieu, and also to the orthodox and heterodox beliefs, the latter “implying awareness and
recognition of the possibility of different or antagonistic beliefs” (1977:164). 
6. Stephanie Lawson discusses the relevance of Friedman’s concept of “traditional authority” for
anthropology, in her article The Tyranny of Tradition: Critical Reflections on Nationalist Narratives in
the South Pacific (1997:15-32). 
7. What justifies the in authority may be some very pragmatic or utilitarian considerations. For
Richard Flathman, this is one of the main reasons for opposing the concept of surrender of private
judgement, because he finds that it is not justified – in the sense that one may be supportive of the
existence of authority in modern society. He writes: “On this view of the matter the production
of such goods provides authority with the same kind of justification that a system of slavery
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receives when the masters are benevolent enough to accord various benefits to their slaves. From
an existential  (as  opposed  to  a  principled)  perspective,  this  may be  no  insignificant  matter.
Under circumstances that have been all too common in human affairs it may be the only matter
of  existential  significance  to  the  slaves  or  to  the  slave-like  subjects  of  those  masters.  The
argument  can  hardly  pass  muster  as  a  principled  defence  of  the  practice  of  authority”
(1980:222). He himself only sees authority justified if it enhances human agency, something that
he finds is contradictory to a concept of surrender of judgement. One may agree, but on the other
hand, it can be said that it is not necessarily so that the surrender of judgement is causing a
limitation in agency – it  may even be necessary to subject oneself  to authority for a certain
period in order to await the possibility of acting. But see below. 
8. This  specific  presupposition  (should)  legitimise  a  position  where  one  finds  that  authority
relations may be justified, for example towards a position of “philosophical anarchism”. 
9. In the tradition in which Friedman (partly) writes, the concept of authority is often treated as
a normative universalistic concept, but here Friedman clearly moves away from other writers
such as Joseph Raz (op.cit.) and Hart (1990:92-114). For a discussion of Raz’s position (and that of
Friedman), see Steven Lukes (op.cit.). 
10. That  the  councils  are  able  to  adjust  is  certainly  not  the  only  reason for  the  continuing
importance of the non-state councils. These institutions are an integral part of Upper Egyptian
life, and multiple layers of meanings and functions are ascribed to them. Some authors, however,
are pointing in very different directions (see H. C. Korsholm Nielsen, forthcoming). 
11. See Alrabaa (1986:65-87) for descriptions of these from the popular quarter of Bulaq in Cairo. 
12. For more details about this differentiation between the different levels of conflict and the
councils pertaining to them, see H. C. Korsholm Nielsen, 1998. 
13. Their  importance  for  Upper  Egyptian  society  cannot  be  overstated,  but  it  important  to
remember that these do not exist in a vacuum, but alongside the legal institutions of the state,
with which they interact. 
14. These two examples of documents are chosen out of a collection of around two hundred
pertaining to the reconciliation councils of the Edfu area, collected between 1995 and 2001. The
collection  mainly  contains  documents  finalizing  disputes,  settling  inheritance  issues,
“authorisations” – and complaints submitted to the official authorities in cases where a party has
felt that the solution reached by a council has not been correct, etc. 
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